Will Germany Lead Europe to War Again
Summary
- A new poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that EU citizens view Germany as a trustworthy, pro-European power.
- Angela Merkel's approach of searching for compromises between competing interests is a major source of Berlin'southward positive paradigm. Pluralities in all countries polled would back up her in a hypothetical election for president of Europe if her opponent was Emmanuel Macron.
- Merkel's rule has reduced neighbours' fear of German dominance. Near Europeans do not believe a German heading the European Committee is a bad thing. And significant numbers trust Berlin to lead the Eu, especially on financial and economic bug and democracy and the rule of police.
- Paradoxically, to fulfil many Europeans' expectations, Berlin will need to revise the principles of Merkelism that created this trust.
- Germany will need to practise this to successfully pb the EU in tackling the two greatest threats facing information technology: a weakening of the dominion of police force inside the EU, and a failure on the role of Europe to defend its interests in the earth.
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Introduction
A few weeks ahead of the Bundestag election on 26 September, Germans are withal struggling to imagine their country without Chancellor Angela Merkel. This may exist to practise with the profiles of the candidates or the low quality of the electoral campaign. But the personality of Merkel seems to provide an fifty-fifty better explanation for Germans' wariness nearly seeing someone else in the chancellor'due south seat. Merkel was a perfect symbol of the German language zeitgeist at the first of the 20-showtime century. Her policy style and decisions accept reflected the significant changes happening in German language society and politics in the final 16 years, likewise as an overwhelming desire to maintain the status quo for as long as possible past avoiding revolutionary shifts. No wonder Germans will miss her.
Will other Europeans miss her too? European summits without the 'empress of Europe' will probably feel like Agatha Christie'south detective stories without Miss Marple. What will Merkel'southward European legacy be, and how long will it last? She has oftentimes been accused of dividing the European Union, especially in the context of the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and Berlin's unwavering back up for the Nord Stream ii pipeline. However, this is not what Europeans say when they retrieve of the High german chancellor. Equally demonstrated by a survey the European Quango on Foreign Relations conducted in 12 EU member states, they have pregnant expectations of Frg and confidence in German leadership. The poll shows that, despite Merkel's often divisive policies, Europeans tend to encounter Berlin every bit an integrating strength and a trustworthy, pro-European ability. They regard Merkel as the European union's unifier – an image that she would no doubt embrace.
However, her successor should not exist tempted to pursue a strategy of 'more of the same'. ECFR's information suggest that a mere continuation of Merkelism would non consolidate the adept reputation Deutschland has caused in European societies. This is the paradox of Merkel'southward legacy: Deutschland owes its success by and large to factors that are not sustainable and to circumstances that are now in the past. In other words, Berlin's actions in contempo decades have raised expectations nearly Frg's potential to exist the benevolent leader that a crisis-ridden EU needs so badly, struggling as it is to defend its values and find a place in a world of renewed great power competition. To fulfil this part, Berlin will have to reinvent itself. Most importantly, it volition need to revise those principles of Merkelism that fabricated Europeans place their hopes on Frg.
Mission accomplished: Merkel'due south Germany every bit the groovy unifier
Throughout the Merkel years, the German authorities's mantra virtually its part in the EU was always 'keep the union together'. As the central power of Europe, Germany wanted to be seen as a forcefulness of moderation and conciliation, not equally a hegemon. In view of the many centrifugal forces that have strengthened nationalist and Eurosceptic actors across the world, Deutschland's tiptop priority has been to consolidate and preserve what had been achieved. This became particularly clear after the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the United States. Merkel'southward aim was to prevent the collapse of the European union's primal political pillars and to strengthen it every bit a bulwark against the erosion of the liberal international order. Unlike French President Emmanuel Macron, yet, Merkel did not button forward ambitious reform proposals. Instead, she advocated minor, anticipated steps to manage the many challenges the union faced. In other words, she tried to alter just enough to maintain the status quo. Her priority was to make political moves as inclusive equally possible, often settling for the lowest common denominator. She was convinced that there was no consensus in the EU for radical reforms or further integration, and that Macron's attempts to be more than ambitious would but divide the union.
Merkel for 'EU president'
EU citizens seem to favour Merkel'south approach over Macron's. In response to ECFR'southward hypothetical question near who they would vote for as 'president of the Eu' if Merkel and Macron were the merely candidates, majorities in the netherlands, Spain, and Portugal said that they would cull the chancellor – as did pluralities in all other surveyed countries (including French republic). Taken together, 41 per cent of all respondents would vote for her, compared to only 14 per cent for Macron. This contest was not close in any of the surveyed countries – although support for Merkel varied across them (for instance, it was 27 percentage points college in holland than in Bulgaria). With her technocratic leadership style, she appears to have won the trust of Europeans much more than than Macron has with his visionary speeches. The fact that Merkel is so much more than pop than Macron in non only kingdom of the netherlands and Kingdom of spain but likewise Portugal and Denmark shows how much she tin exist an integrating force in different corners of the Eu. The Nordic 'frugal' states and the countries of the European union's southward often have diametrically opposed positions on many aspects of European policy, especially economic and fiscal matters. Since support for Merkel is high in both camps, she appears to take succeeded in conveying the message that she is committed to addressing the concerns of both of them, positioning Deutschland as a unifying power.
In Germany we trust
In retrospect, Merkel's greatest success in European policy is probably that she has placed Federal republic of germany at the heart of an enlarged EU and significantly reduced its neighbours' fear of German dominance. The European public seem to exist far less worried most a German ability catch in EU institutions than elites in Brussels are. Today, but x per cent of respondents believe that a German president of the European Commission is a bad matter, while 27 per cent fifty-fifty think that it is a adept thing. Citizens in Italian republic (where 21 per cent say it is a bad thing but simply every bit many – 21 per cent – say it is a expert thing ) and Poland (where xviii per cent say it is bad) are the nearly critical national groupings. Still, majorities or pluralities in all countries say that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's nationality makes no departure – which suggests that people do not run into her as any kind of lobbyist for the High german regime.
Today'due south Frg is a leading power in which many Europeans place their trust to defend their interests on a range of problems. Equally ECFR's data show, the two policy areas in which this trust is most pronounced are economical and fiscal policy and the defence force of democracy and man rights.
In every surveyed country, economic and financial policy comes top or every bit a close second among areas in which respondents trust Germany to defend European interests. This finding seems paradoxical for two reasons. Firstly, the Merkel government'south back up for thrift during the eurozone crisis and obsession with public debt and Deutschland's huge trade surplus take drawn more criticism than any other policies. German economic policy was widely regarded every bit the EU'south biggest trouble, ane that would ultimately lead to the EU's disintegration. Secondly, citizens of countries with diverse economic philosophies all see Germany as an advocate of European interests. These numbers were 50 per cent in Hungary (which is not a member of the eurozone), 45 per cent in Spain (whose government wants the EU to move towards a fiscal union), and 43 per cent in the Netherlands (the de facto leader of the frugal countries grouping). And while the figure is just 24 per cent in Italy, it was still the most popular option among those who expressed an stance.
This may also be partly the event of German policy during the coronavirus crisis, in which Berlin has tried to achieve the broadest possible consensus on the integration of the NextGenerationEU recovery plan into the EU budget, taking all member states' interests into account. Another reason could exist that Europe's citizens run across Germany equally an economic powerhouse that has weathered the numerous crises of the past decade much better than many other European countries – and, therefore, should serve as a office model for the EU. These considerations may weigh more on their perceptions of Berlin than any economic analysis that frames Frg's growth as coming largely at the expense of other Eu member states.
The defence force of commonwealth and human rights is the 2d policy expanse in which at that place is greatest conviction in Germany'due south part equally a leader that acts in the European involvement. Although Merkel has always resisted the attribution of 'leader of the free world', Eu citizens see her every bit the leader of a gratis Europe. It seems reasonable to assume that this partly reflects many Europeans' appreciation of the stance that Merkel adopted during the migration crunch. They trust Federal republic of germany to stand upwardly for those values and principles that are of existential importance to Western commonwealth. This sentiment is evident across all countries in ECFR'due south survey, including Hungary (49 per cent) and Poland (23 per cent), whose governments are currently under an European union Commodity vii sanctions procedure – which is designed to define whether a member state is at take a chance of a "serious alienation" of EU values. To be sure, supporters of the two countries' ruling parties drive their national averages down (but eleven per cent of Police and Justice's current supporters, and 28 per cent of Fidesz's electric current supporters, trust Frg to defend commonwealth – whereas the figures are much higher among supporters of the opposition).
However, while Europeans' levels of trust in Germany to defend the European involvement are relatively loftier on economic policy and the defence of democracy and human rights, they are comparatively low when it comes to dealing with the world's great powers. Berlin has the confidence of more than one-third of EU citizens in handling economic issues and standing up for autonomous values, merely only 17 per cent of them believe that Germany tin lead the bloc in its relations with Red china. In handling the EU's relations with Russia and the US, only one-5th and ane-quarter of Europeans trust Germany respectively. Europeans fifty-fifty have greater confidence in Germany on defense and security matters – which should reassure those in Berlin who debate that Germany cannot invest more in its military because this would worry its neighbours.
These findings ostend that European union citizens do non necessarily trust Federal republic of germany to atomic number 82 the Eu in their interests in a world of intensifying great power contest. When information technology comes to geopolitics, Berlin'due south credibility is limited – especially in comparing to other policy areas.
This may not be surprising. Merkel's policy on China has often been largely informed by German language national economical interests and not broader geopolitical considerations. One can hardly perceive the policy every bit having been 'Europeanised'. The chancellor established a common European front after the Russian annexation of Crimea (one of her key strange policy accomplishments) merely compromised her legacy with her unwavering support for Nord Stream 2. While the German government likes to present itself every bit a pioneer of a articulation European strange policy, its neighbours remain sceptical.
This corresponds with the conventionalities amid respondents in all surveyed countries (except for Hungary) that, had Merkel not been chancellor, there would accept been more than conflict in the world. But this does non mean that they regard her as a forcefulness for peace: pluralities everywhere believe that her chancellorship has made no difference to conflicts effectually the world. Europeans appear to encounter her as existence not very 'geopolitical', suggesting that the diplomatic (and armed services) efforts of the German government have either gone unnoticed or been ineffective during the strange policy crises of recent years.
At the same time, however, Europeans see a need for the EU to become a more than united and powerful international player. A survey that ECFR conducted in leap 2021 shows that Europeans are highly aware that, in an era of nifty power contest, they must rely more on themselves. Even with Joe Biden in the White Firm, there is withal a widespread lack of confidence in the United States' ability to come dorsum as the 'leader' of the West. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan has shown that Biden is pursuing a foreign and security policy focused on narrowly defined national interests and no longer wants to meet the United states of america in the role of 'world policeman'. Therefore, Europeans think it is necessary to cultivate strategic partnerships with diverse countries – including Russia, Mainland china, and Turkey – and to boost the EU'southward global office. In seven out of 12 surveyed countries, a plurality of respondents said that the European union should react to the pandemic by developing a unified European policy on global threats and challenges.
One should recognise the implications of the relative lack of trust in Federal republic of germany's dealings with dandy powers. In time to come, it will become even more of import for Germany to advocate a common European strange policy and to credibly demonstrate that information technology engages with Prc, Russia, and the US primarily to protect European interests rather than just its ain.
Federal republic of germany as an advocate for pro-European union voters
I articulate finding of ECFR's survey is that Europeans' attitudes towards the EU and European values correlate with their perceptions of Germany. Those for whom being European is at least as important as their national identity tend to be more positive nearly Deutschland's office. And they are likewise more probable to believe in the superiority of democracies over autocracies on a range of issues.
In all five countries in which ECFR asked most European identity – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden – those that said their European identity is at least as important to them as their nationality were much more probable than average to say that information technology is adept that the president of the European Commission is German language. Conversely, respondents that have less of an attachment to their European identity – who are often supporters of populist correct-fly parties such as Constabulary and Justice, the League, and the Alternative for Deutschland – are more likely to disapprove of the president of the European Commission being High german.
Merkel would have much stronger support for the presidency of Europe than Macron amidst respondents who feel European. Conversely, those who strongly disagree with the argument on European identity are more likely than boilerplate to say that they would not vote in an election for such a position.
Overall, respondents who feel a strong sense of European identity are more likely than boilerplate to appreciate German leadership on a range of issues – and much less likely to say they do non similar it on any result. The findings of ECFR's survey are specially interesting for those who strongly agree that European identity is important: more than twoscore per cent of them trust Federal republic of germany on economic and financial policy, and on continuing up for commonwealth and human rights. In addition, the survey shows that supporters of populist correct parties are the least confident in Germany's leadership in both policy areas.
Those with a stiff European identity are also more probable than other respondents to believe that at that place would be more conflict in the globe if Merkel had not been chancellor (fifty-fifty if the predominant view among them is nevertheless that information technology makes no divergence). And those with little sense of European identity are more likely than average to say that it would take made no difference.
In all, this suggests that respondents' views of Federal republic of germany are closely related to their views of Europe. In other words, they view Berlin and its deportment through a European prism.
The murky future of Merkelism
Merkel has a fairly impressive record in coming together the expectations of Eu citizens who are from various corners of Europe and accept diverse interests. This is particularly clear confronting the background of criticism of Germany'south policy across Europe in recent years. Nether Merkel'southward leadership, Frg seems to have lived up to its self-defined goal of leading from the middle and keeping the EU together – at to the lowest degree in the eyes of a large share of Europeans. Merkel owes her reputation to a policy style based on skilful balancing between various interests, with the aim of finding compromises that satisfy all parties involved. Absolutely, she has at times achieved remarkable results through her perseverance – every bit seen in the establishment of the NextGenerationEU recovery fund and EU sanctions on Russia, neither of which would have come virtually without her mediation skills.
Merkelism has, as ECFR'south survey shows, proved to be a good investment for Germany. Whatever the experience of Europe's ruling elites and the opinions of its pundits, Merkel'southward legacy will be one of having convinced EU citizens that Federal republic of germany is a European power. This significant political capital letter of trust and recognition could provide the post-Merkel German leadership with a solid foundation to build on.
However, the policy of remaining neutral and avoiding tough solutions to Europe's predicaments does not seem to be a feasible approach to the challenges alee. The downside of wanting to bring everyone on board and to make European union cohesion an absolute priority is that information technology limits i'south ability to deed. Many of the about pressing challenges Europe faces are impossible to address with the Merkel method. Dealing with the pandemic, climate change, and growing geopolitical competition requires not only cosmetic changes but political support for more radical solutions. Merkelism is unlikely to outlast Merkel non considering information technology is simply her who can practise it merely because the European union will need a more visionary and mettlesome Deutschland to strengthen its foundations and defend its place in the world. Many Europeans seem ready to accept this shift – and may even be waiting for Berlin to initiate it.
A new European landscape
The main reason for the limited shelf-life of Merkelism is a alter in the nature of European integration. With Merkel stepping down, it is becoming apparent that the effects of integration have changed in the by decade. Merkel has congenital her reputation as Europe's beginning crisis chancellor. The bloc has come up under astringent strain from disagreements betwixt fellow member states on the nature of fiscal and economic policy, asylum policy, the rule of law, and Brexit. The European union has been preoccupied with internal problems – albeit with some of import exceptions, such every bit the Trump presidency, equally well every bit Russia'due south assailment against Ukraine. And Merkel's key mission was to bridge internal divides, reconcile divergent positions, and thereby protect the Eu's cohesion in the name of unity above all else. Indeed, her historic accomplishment is keeping the EU together in a decade in which many Europeans feared it would pause autonomously.
However, if one looks at the EU and Europeans today, a troubling picture emerges of a continent divided by values and exposed to new threats. The compromises that Federal republic of germany has come to embody, and that have get the pillars of Merkel's policy, will be fifty-fifty harder to reach in futurity. Most importantly, Merkel'due south departure coincides with two major challenges for the European projection – both of which have a different scope and nature to the crises the chancellor handled so skilfully. They volition require a different strategy to Merkel'south.
The first claiming will exist to stand up upwardly for European union values and principles no less than for the bloc'south unity. In the last few years, they accept come under attack more ever. And, as much as Europeans associate Merkel with the defence of Western values, her lack of engagement to preclude Europe's dominion of law crisis from getting out of command may accept been the greatest failure of her Europe policy. Under her leadership, Deutschland was non at the forefront of efforts to protect democracy and the rule of constabulary – to say the least. The rise of Prime Minister Viktor Orban's autocratic system in Hungary would not have been possible without Berlin's acquiescence.
Germany'south passivity on the effect stemmed from political party loyalty (Fidesz was until 2020 a member of the European People's Party, a grouping that includes Merkel's Christian Democratic Union); German companies' economical interests in Visegrad countries; and – perhaps about chiefly – the Merkel doctrine's emphasis on risk avoidance and fear of disharmonize. All this prevented Federal republic of germany from interim before information technology was too late. Orban saw this strategy as a sign of weakness, and exploited information technology appropriately.
Berlin followed a similar line of aussitzen (sitting it out) on Poland. Merkel was instrumental in preventing the conflict over the independence of the Polish judiciary from escalating, in the vain hope of a compromise that could satisfy both sides. Germany'due south historical sensitivities and its involvement in keeping neighbouring Poland in the European union mainstream at whatsoever price also played a major role in this strategy. Deutschland'due south try to avoid escalation backfired. The crisis reached its peak in July 2021, when the Smooth authorities opposed the right of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to arbitrate in member states' judicial systems if they lost their independence. To undermine this competence of the CJEU would exist to risk the collapse of the EU's legal society.
The breakdown of the EU's fundamental values – around the supremacy of EU law, the role of the CJEU, judicial independence, and minority rights – could destroy the union, peculiarly if it coincided with the emergence of an authoritarian equilibrium backed by EU funds. Addressing this challenge will crave a much more straightforward approach than the one pursued by Merkel. The goal of preserving EU unity will remain important. Just, with autocrats pushing the conflict nearly the fundamentals of the European projection to the extreme, there is no effective way to adopt Merkel'due south conflict-averse sowohl-als-auch (as well as) policy. A long-term strategy to defend both the unity of the EU and its cadre values will require a brusque-term, principled focus on the latter. If post-Merkel Germany wants to protect the European project – and, therefore, much of Merkel'southward legacy – it will accept to openly lend political support to decisive action against those who assail the foundations of the matrimony. The Eu and its member states can but attain this by abandoning Merkelism. The trust Europeans have in Germany when it comes to defending democracy gives the next federal government a mandate to do merely that.
The 2d challenge post-Merkel Germany volition face relates to the processes shaping the new calendar of the EU. Developments within the European union are no longer the primary influence on the direction of the marriage's politics. For a long fourth dimension during the Merkel era, it seemed every bit if the EU had taken a geopolitical vacation from history. The Eu saw like-minded partners emerging in every region of the globe and expected that countries such equally China and Russian federation would move closer to the West in the long run. Merely a complimentary, secure, prosperous, and socially just Europe now faces massive threats from the exterior – and is not prepared to confront them. The EU agenda is increasingly shaped by external problems and influences. The climate crisis has forced the European union to fundamentally rethink its economic and social agenda. This has resulted in the European Green Deal, which is designed to create a new socio-economic model based on the principle of climate neutrality. The United States' efforts to refocus its foreign policy away from Europe is forcing the EU to change its security policy and move towards more strategic sovereignty. The rise of Mainland china confronts the EU with the need to develop a coherent and measured response to what has become a systemic rival.
The fundamental challenge for the EU in the next decade will be to defend and modernise its governance model in a world in which its role is likely to decrease. Merkel's approach of sitting on the debate will no longer be viable, specially in view of the conflict between the Usa and Mainland china, which increasingly dominates world affairs. Deutschland volition be forced to establish a much stronger position for itself and the EU in this conflict. Therefore, in the coming years, German language leadership in the EU will require more than than maintaining the bloc's unity (fifty-fifty if this will remain a primal task for Berlin, not to the lowest degree in view of these external challenges). Deutschland's perceived weakness in great ability relations is likely to get increasingly problematic – unless Berlin positions itself as a more trustworthy leader in dealing with actors such as China and Russian federation.
Germany will have to exit its comfort zone in areas in which information technology neither wanted to pb nor was trusted to do so in the Merkel era. If mail-Merkel Deutschland is to attain the prototype of a truly European ability, it volition need to provide its European partners with articulate-cut ideas nearly the Eu'south part and positions in an increasingly competitive and crisis-shaken international environment. The new High german government must demonstrate more conspicuously than before that it sees the relationship with China and Russian federation in the light of European and not primarily High german interests. And information technology needs to lead the way towards a post-dependent Atlanticism that has a strong European angle.
Federal republic of germany'south fading star
Volition Germany encounter the challenges arising from this new political constellation? As discussed, Europeans have developed an appreciation for Germany's arroyo to, and part in, Europe. At the same time, though, they are far less optimistic when it comes to the future of the land. To put it frankly, a plurality of EU citizens meet Germany as a declining power. This may non exist the best point of departure for postal service-Merkel Federal republic of germany.
Across all 12 surveyed countries, 34 per cent of respondents believe that Germany's golden age is a thing of the past. Meanwhile, for 21 per cent of respondents, the Merkel era seems to marking the peak of Deutschland's prosperity – they concur with the statement that Germany is now living through its golden age. A mere ten per cent of Europeans expect that Federal republic of germany's golden age is still to come. This overall pattern applies in almost every surveyed country individually. Spain and Sweden are the but member states in which a plurality of respondents see Germany'southward present as more glorious than its past. Frg, Austria, and Republic of hungary are the only ones in which a plurality or majority come across Germany's past every bit more than glorious than its present. And while "don't know" is the most common reply in seven surveyed countries, it is remarkable that two of Germany's neighbours – kingdom of the netherlands and Kingdom of denmark – are those in which the highest proportion of people were unsure how to answer the question.
Information technology is intriguing that a plurality of Europeans believe Frg'due south golden age is in the past but would choose Merkel as president of Europe over Macron. This suggests that information technology is not but in Federal republic of germany but as well in Europe more broadly that Merkel every bit a political figure is more popular than the results of her rule. Without Merkel, the foundations of Germany'due south leadership part in the EU will be significantly weaker – unless the new government implements a credible strategy that goes beyond Merkelism.
If many Europeans believe Frg'south star is fading, this could undermine their trust in Berlin. Their positive attitudes towards Merkel's Federal republic of germany seem to have had a lot to practise with the country'due south stable economic growth and low unemployment in the final two decades despite challenging economic weather condition in Europe. Information technology seems that, unlike in the past, Germany's power and prosperity at present contribute to its epitome as a reliable partner.
Judging past ECFR's information, Europeans who come across Germany'south golden age as existence in the present or the time to come are more than likely than others to trust Berlin'southward chapters to lead the EU on a range of issues. I can meet this as yet another sign of a remarkable achievement of the Merkel era: there appears to be no fear of a strong Germany.
Appropriately, those who regard Germany's glory days every bit existence in the past – and at that place are many of them (34 per cent) – tend to have less conviction in Berlin'south leadership. For example, 26 per cent do not trust Germany to defend any of the European interests presented in the question .
This overall motion picture suggests that, should scepticism about Germany's prosperity go more widespread in Europe, Europeans may get less willing to see Berlin equally a pillar of Europeanism. The covid-19 crunch has brought to low-cal Germany's neglect of its infrastructure and lack of investment in digitalisation. In addition, the intensifying geopolitical disharmonize betwixt the US and People's republic of china poses enormous challenges for the High german economy, which is heavily dependent on globalisation and exports. Growing scepticism about Germany's economic system would erode trust in its ability to pb Europe, severely impeding its ability to do then.
German cynicism
Whether Germany meets the expectations raised by the fairly successful Merkel era will largely depend on German citizens themselves. Europeans do not seem to exist too agape of a cocky-confident, powerful, and prosperous Germany, even if many of them are sceptical near the state'southward prospects. However, the relative success story of the Merkel years has not necessarily translated into a positive self-perception among Germans. Most of them practise not see their country as the European union'south leading ability. And pessimism about Germany's futurity is even more widespread amidst Germans than other Europeans.
Fifty-two per cent of Germans believe that their state's golden age is in the past. They are by far the about pessimistic about its future among Europeans (aside from Austrians, who are equally pessimistic).
Germans exercise not seem to be emotionally prepared for the role of Europe's leading power either. Just when it comes to standing up for democracy and human rights do more than i-third (38 per cent) of Germans trust that their country tin defend European interests. On economic and financial issues, besides equally on security and defence, Germans have less trust in Berlin to provide European leadership than other Europeans practise. While 29 per cent of other Europeans trust Germany to lead on defence and security, but twenty per cent of Germans do (the smallest proportion in any of the 12 surveyed countries). Similarly, 37 per cent of Europeans would be happy with Germany's leadership on economical and fiscal issues, but only 31 per cent of Germans would be (a smaller proportion than in any national group aside from Italians, Poles, and the French). Twenty per cent of Germans do not trust Germany to provide leadership on any of the bug covered past ECFR's survey (the third-largest proportion of whatever national grouping, subsequently Poles and Austrians). Other Europeans are slightly less pessimistic: only fifteen per cent practice not trust Germany to defend European interests on whatever of the problems covered past the written report.
At the same time, Germans do non fear that they will fall back into nationalism. Only 19 per cent of them believe that there is such a risk – compared to 27 per cent in the other 11 surveyed countries. In turn, 36 per cent of Germans expect their country to become even more focused on helping other Europeans, significantly more than the 25 per cent of respondents in other surveyed countries. Therefore, Germans have a fairly positive image of their own intentions but do not seem to believe that their country's ability to provide leadership is a precondition for being reliable and supportive of other member states. In the postal service-Merkel era, this may not exist the correct decision. Germans may need to shake off their doubts about Deutschland's leadership, considering other Europeans are counting on it to provide this.
Conclusion: From Eu unity to the defence of the European model
Germany will have to shoulder new responsibilities in the post-Merkel era. This shift is strongly related non but to the point achievements of the outgoing chancellor but the fact that, under her leadership, the German government has the trust and support of virtually EU citizens who feel strongly attached to the European projection. In their eyes, Germany seems to exist a beacon of Western values, including democracy and the dominion of constabulary, likewise as the EU'south anchor in difficult times. They place their hopes on Germany to defend the European order. This makes Federal republic of germany a European power par excellence.
However, bringing hope to the defenders of a liberal Europe is not only an opportunity. It too creates risks and challenges. To run across them, postal service-Merkel Germany will have to recalibrate its foreign and European policy strategy, leave its comfort zone, and go beyond Merkelism. The Merkel era has been marked past the need to go along the Eu together under intensifying internal and external force per unit area. Merkel excelled at this task and rightly gained an appreciation for information technology across Europe. Nevertheless, in the post-Merkel era, this will non be enough. Adjacent to keeping the EU together, the goal of defending cadre European values and interests should go the mensurate of a responsible European union leadership. In particular, Germany will need to lead the fight against the two most dangerous threats the EU will face in the coming years.
The first threat is that of a breakup of the rule of law in the European union, one acquired by the ascent autocratic tendencies of some member states' governments. The European political landscape is increasingly defined by the 'democratic versus autocratic' and 'cosmopolitan versus nationalistic' divides. Merkel'southward Germany has been instrumental in either bridging these divides or, more than often than not, fugitive them. While Europeans on one side of the divides appreciate Germany's leadership, those on the other side mistrust or oppose it. In other words, Merkel proved to be the EU's great unifier in geographical terms. Citizens of fellow member states in all regions of Europe have similar assessments of Germany.
Even so, Germany may need to get a much more straightforward defender of the values and principles European society is based upon. The state may have to learn how to accept the price of becoming less amicable towards the autocratic nationalist side of the conflict. Information technology is impossible to satisfy both sides. And attempting to practice so would exist detrimental to the European project.
The European union cannot survive without mutual standards of judicial independence, respect for the values enshrined in Articles 2 and 19 of the Treaty on European Wedlock, or – crucially – the recognition of the CJEU as the ultimate arbiter of the estimation of those principles. It is exactly these fundamental rules that have been under attack from populists and autocrats. Stepping bated in the faint promise of a compromise would effect in a historic failure. No less importantly, disappointing European union citizens who identify with European values and oppose nationalism would besides have disastrous consequences. The engagement and optimism of these citizens, who place their hopes on German leadership, is fundamental to the EU'southward hereafter in difficult times.
The second threat that would overmatch Merkelism is that of the EU'due south geopolitical marginalisation. For a long fourth dimension, Frg'south friends and partners have been calling on the country to play a greater international role. Merkel herself acknowledges that the times when the EU could fully rely on others are "somewhat over", and that Europeans demand to do more than to provide for their ain security and defend their interests in the world. Germany is the crucial player here; it is now high time for information technology to finally upwardly its game. In many means, Merkelism (which oftentimes came with mercantilism) has only been possible because the Us provided leadership of the Western bloc and the rules-based multilateral order seemed to be holding together. With the globe inbound what Mark Leonard calls the "age of unpeace", this is no longer the example. And Merkel's departure is a symbol of this historic shift in the Western alliance.
As ECFR's polling data show, Europeans are enlightened of this new reality and are concerned about Europe's diminishing role in the world. Fifty-fifty more than importantly, they acknowledge that geopolitical competition now poses an existential threat to the European project. Germany must define a new response to these fears and expectations.
More than ofttimes than non, Berlin will have to clearly position itself in defence of EU principles, international rules, republic, the dominion of law, and human rights. Information technology will need to find a fashion out of the cul-de-sac it manoeuvred itself into with the Nord Stream 2 saga, when it ignored geopolitics in the proper name of economics. And information technology will demand to apply its economic and political clout to work closely with the Biden administration on a articulation transatlantic approach to China. This ways that Germany will have to accept sides fifty-fifty at the cost of the conflicts and tensions its decisions may create. The Merkel era created a solid foundation for this office by convincing the Europeans that Germany's power tin can be used in Europe's interests. It volition be up to the next government in Berlin to redesign European and strange policy in a style that will permit Federal republic of germany to wield this power in future.
The cardinal challenge for the post-Merkel leadership in Berlin will be to convince Germans that changing gears in European and foreign policy would be in both Europe's interests and their ain. Every bit one of these authors recently argued, German policymakers and politicians should talk less often almost the fact that Germany has a special responsibility in Europe because of its history, size, and location. They should explain how the EU helps Federal republic of germany increase its influence, heighten its prosperity, and protect the German public. The 'Munich consensus' – the confidence that Germany's international appointment ought to have come earlier, been more decisive, and had greater substance – may have shaped the foreign policy discourse of the last few years of the Merkel era. But at that place is at present a need for a 'Berlin consensus' – which would combine a more than principled stance on European values with the strategy and resource required to stand upward for them in a new geopolitical environs. This would be the best way to ensure that Merkel'southward legacy outlives Merkelism.
Methodology
This paper is based on a public opinion poll in 12 EU countries that the European Quango on Foreign Relations commissioned from Datapraxis and YouGov (Republic of austria, Kingdom of denmark, France, Deutschland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden), AnalitiQs (the Netherlands), Blastoff (Bulgaria), and Szondaphone (Republic of hungary). The survey was conducted in tardily May and early June 2021, with an overall sample of xvi,267 respondents.
This was an online survey conducted in Republic of austria (north = 1,014), Kingdom of denmark (n = 1,015), France (north = 3,110), Germany (n = iii,001), Italy (n = 1,002), kingdom of the netherlands (northward = 1,004), Poland (n = 1,060), Portugal (n = i,000), Spain (n = ane,011), and Sweden (n = 1,047). In Bulgaria (n = 1,002), the survey was conducted online and through telephone interviews. In Hungary (north = 1,001), it was conducted using phone interviews just. The results are nationally representative of basic demographics and past votes in each country. YouGov used purposive active sampling for this poll.
The general margin of error is ±three per cent for a sample of 1,000 and ±2 per cent for a sample of 3,000.
The exact dates of polling are: Austria (19-27 May), Bulgaria (28 May-6 June), Denmark (19-26 May), French republic (26 May-iv June), Germany (twenty-27 May), Hungary (27 May-7 June), Italian republic (25 May-4 June), kingdom of the netherlands (20-24 May), Poland (21 May-9 June), Portugal (20 May-2 June), Kingdom of spain (two-seven June), and Sweden (25 May-1 June).
The segmentation into three groups of people who feel European, those who exercise not, and those who are hesitant, is based on whether they agree or disagree with the following sentence: "Being European is at least equally important to me as existence my nationality". Respondents who feel European are those who "strongly hold" or "agree" with this statement. Respondents who are hesitant are those who "neither agree nor disagree" with this statement. Respondents who exercise non feel European are those who either "strongly disagree" or "disagree". This question was asked but in five countries (French republic, Deutschland, Italy, Poland, and Sweden). The presented data exclude those who skipped the question.
Well-nigh the authors
Piotr Buras is head of the Warsaw office and senior policy fellow at the European Quango on Foreign Relations. Between 2008 and 2012 he worked in Berlin forGazeta Wyborcza, the biggest Smoothen daily paper. His fields of expertise include Poland in the European Matrimony, the rule of law, and German politics. Buras recently published "Defending the EU confronting g corruption: Dominion of law conditionality machinery and Poland" (with Piotr Bogdanowicz; July 2021).
Jana Puglierin is head of the Berlin function and senior policy fellow at the European Quango on Strange Relations. She is also a manager of ECFR'southward Re:shape Global Europe initiative, which aims to shed new light on the irresolute international club and how it affects Europe's place in the world. Her contempo publications include: "Crisis of confidence: How Europeans run into their place in the earth" (June 2021) and "How to prevent Germany from becoming Eurosceptic" (June 2021).
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank their colleagues from the European Council on Foreign Relations for their diverse invaluable contributions to this newspaper. Pawel Zerka did a tremendous job analysing the polling data and helping formulate hypotheses. Marlene Riedel, Gosia Piaskowska, and Solène Cazals worked on the visualisation of the information and supported the authors with their verification. Chris Raggett and Adam Harrison were, every bit e'er, great and nearly helpful editors. Susi Dennison fabricated useful remarks on the first draft of the newspaper. Last only not least, Susanne Baumann, Swantje Green, and colleagues from ECFR's national offices contributed to the brainstorming that helped the authors mankind out their thoughts. As e'er, responsibility for whatever mistakes remains the authors' own.
Nosotros would also like to thank Paul Hilder and his team at Datapraxis for their patient collaboration with u.s. in developing and analysing the polling referred to in the written report, and to Alpha, AnalytiQs, Szondaphone, and YouGov for conducting the fieldwork. We very much appreciate the partnership with Thinktank Europa on this project, and on our polling work in general.
Nosotros would also like to give thanks the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation for their back up for the research in this projection.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not accept commonage positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of its individual authors.
Source: https://ecfr.eu/publication/beyond-merkelism-what-europeans-expect-of-post-election-germany/
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